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Drawing on Michel Foucault’s theoretical reservoir, this paper conceptualises restorative justice as an 
‘apparatus’, that is, a dynamic ensemble of elements whose emergence is related to the development of 
a distinctive political rationality (ethopolitics). This approach enables a multidimensional 
comprehension of restorative justice, since it targets both discursive and non-discursive elements, their 
power/knowledge relations and subjugating effects. Furthermore, the paper explores possibilities for an 
emancipatory restorative justice, against the subjective entrapment that the apparatus produces. Overall, 
this work aims to offer a theoretically engaged and critical scrutiny of restorative justice by using an 
underexploited analytical device – the apparatus – apt to make visible unexpected dimensions of this 
“new” frontier of western penality. This could enhance our understanding of the emergence and possible 
trajectories of restorative justice, by identifying risks and opportunities as well as tools for 
disentanglement from its most problematic institutional developments. 
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Introduction 
Over the past forty years, restorative justice (RJ) has slowly emerged as a worldwide field of practice 
and research (Wood and Suzuki 2016). The amount of normative studies on what RJ ‘ought to be’ and 
empirical works on ‘how it works’ outnumbers the critical research on the links between RJ and broader 
political, cultural and social phenomena (Aertsen and Pali 2017; Pavlich 2005; Richards 2005, 2011; 
Woolford and Ratner 2007). This paper contributes toward addressing such a lack of theoretical 
engagement, by using a generative (and relatively underexploited) research device introduced by Michel 
Foucault, that is, the apparatus1 (Foucault 1980[1977]). The apparatus is a ‘grid of interpretation’ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, p. 121) which considers discursive and non-discursive objects (ideologies, 
scientific knowledges, ethical doctrines, legal devices and institutions) by connecting them in both 
conceptually and normatively productive ways, making visible their political conditions and 
subjugating effects. Through this analytical lens RJ is configured as a bundle of power/knowledge 
relations which facilitates the unfolding of a specific political rationality – ethopolitics (Rose 1996a) – 
which in turn reproduces RJ in distinctive ways. Furthermore, the very conceptualisation of RJ as a 
functional and strategic mechanism, urges critical scholars to envision alternative versions of RJ, which 
enact forms of active subjectivation.  
 
The paper starts with a brief review of the Foucauldian concept of apparatus. It then reconstructs RJ as 
an apparatus, focussing on discursive and non-discursive elements, their connection and subjugating 
effects. The final part of the study draws on Foucault’s later ethical reflections (1982, 1984a, 1997), in 
order to generate some preliminary insights into the emancipatory development of RJ. Overall, whilst 
this study does not aim to be exhaustive of RJ’s themes and problems, it does intend to map out this 
field by reorganising its multiple aspects along the apparatus’ lines. The reasons for choosing such an 
approach are as much epistemological as normative. This perspective, in fact, helps both to reformulate 
RJ by bridging dimensions often researched as separate and discrete entities, and to image forms of 
critical resistance to RJ’s institutional developments (Hoy 2004). 
There are three main limitations to the research. Firstly, the illustrative context is drawn from the UK 
and US, and therefore analyses and proposals apply only (or at least mainly) to such countries. A second 
limitation is that this work is an elaboration on theoretical, advocacy and policy material accumulated 
over the last forty years, and as such tends to be at times abstract and over-generalising. However, a 
major aim of this paper is to chart general patterns in the development of RJ (Garland 2001, p. viii). In 
                                               
1 The French word used by Foucault ‘dispositif’ has been translated with ‛apparatus’ largely because this is the 
most common English translation within relevant scholarly literature (see Burchell 2008; Bussolini 2010). 
 light of this, abstraction and generalisation are useful heuristic tools for an insightful analysis. Finally, 
there is a paradoxical “side effect” in employing the apparatus as analytical grid: whilst this device is 
used to offer a non-linear and multi-dimensional representation of the research object, it may render 
this object conceptually smooth and politically cogent. In order to address this limitation, the paper 
considers contingent slippage points, tensions and gaps which disrupt the apparatus’ workings, making 
its structure less stable and its action less compelling. Yet that “side effect” may eventually play a 
strategic role: to stimulate the search for further gaps and flaws within the apparatus, as a first step 
toward alternative and emancipatory reformulations of RJ. 
 
The apparatus 
The concept of ‘apparatus’ [dispositif] features both in books written by Foucault in the 1970s (notably 
The History of Sexuality volume 1) and in his lectures at the Collège de France delivered between 1977 
and 1979. However, the most explicit definition of this methodological notion is given by Foucault in 
an interview released in 1977, whereby he describes the ‘apparatus’ as follows:  
 
‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting 
of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much 
as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that 
can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is 
precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a 
particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can 
function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-
interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these 
elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term 
“apparatus” a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function’ 
(Foucault 1980[1977], p. 194). 
  
Invited to explain the ‘apparatus of sexuality’, Foucault states that this concept refers to a ‘thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble’ of discursive and non-discursive elements, connected by a power/knowledge 
infrastructure. This mechanism is both functional and strategic. The apparatus is functionally integrated 
insofar as its different components are in a ceaseless process of reciprocal alteration and ‘readjustment’ 
of their effects (Foucault 1980[1977], p. 195). The strategic aspect alludes to the apparatus’ emergence 
as a ‘response’ to an ‘urgent need’, that is, to a historical conjuncture which enables the apparatus to 
arise. Methodologically, to organise certain phenomena as an apparatus, warrants the researcher to 
analytically embrace the mobile network in which knowledge and power reproduce themselves, cutting 
across a variety of singularities, at different epistemological and ontological levels. It also urges an 
exploration of the apparatus’ capacity to bring into being something specific in a strategic fashion. Once 
the heterogeneous ensemble has been mapped out, in fact, the question is how this cluster of elements 
is deployed and for which purposes.  
This Foucauldian concept has been object of a sustained philosophical reformulation and critique. Gilles 
Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben have perhaps submitted some of the most original re-elaborations of it. 
Deleuze describes the apparatus as ‘a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each 
having a different nature’ whose major aspects are ‘Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity’ (Deleuze 
1992, p. 159). It is a machine ‘to make one see and speak’ (Deleuze 1992, p. 160), by determining the 
conditions for objects of knowledge to arise. ‘Sovereignty’, ‘discipline’ and ‘control’ are all apparatuses 
which manufacture the actuality of historical societies (Deleuze 1995, pp. 177–178). In a similar vein, 
Agamben (2009, p. 14) describes the apparatus as ‘literally anything that has in some way the capacity 
to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or 
discourses of living beings’, with subjugating effects. Agamben maintains that our societies are assisting 
 a synchronic proliferation of apparatuses, which at the same time entrap the human bare life (Frost 
2015). 
Foucault, Deleuze and Agamben’s understandings overlap insofar as they all yield a typically 
Nietzschean (Bussolini 2010; Raffnsøe et al. 2014) framework for analysing social complexity which 
foregrounds fluidity and relationality, crossing the boundaries between epistemological, ontological and 
normative levels of enquiry. However, divergences are also present. At least two differences should be 
briefly appreciated here, due to their relevance for the reframing of RJ which this paper seeks to 
advance. Firstly, the Foucauldian notion presented in 1977 does not directly contemplate the 
subjugating effects of this strategic mechanism, that is, it does not appraise how the production of 
subjectivities could contribute toward fulfilling the ‘urgent need’ which drives the apparatus’ 
emergence. In Deleuze and Agamben, conversely, the issue of subjective entrapment is integral to their 
very definitions. Deleuze, in fact, emphasises ‘subjectivity’ as one of the three dimensions constitutive 
of the apparatus. Similarly, Agamben focuses on the apparatus’ effect of ‘entrapment’ of the bare life, 
coherently with his previous works on the ‘homo sacer’ (Agamben 1998). Finally, whilst both Deleuze 
and Agamben also afford insights into how to resist or halt the apparatus, Foucault seems to lack 
‘creativity’ on this point (Legg 2011, p. 131). Deleuze sees the apparatus as ‘crucial for discerning 
possibilities for resistance and for the elaboration of new subjectivities’ (Bussolini 2010, p. 102). 
Agamben instead, suggests to halt the apparatus by acts of ‘profanation’, that is, by deactivating ‘the 
apparatuses of power and retur[ing] to common use the spaces that power had seized’ (Agamben 2007, 
p. 77).  
 
The Foucauldian notion of ‘apparatus’ can be rendered more conceptually generative and normatively 
creative by integrating the ideas of ‘subjection to power’ (Foucault 1982) and ethical ‘care of the self’ 
(Foucault 1986) elaborated by Foucault during the last stage of his intellectual journey. This operation 
could open up different dimensions of the phenomenon at stake, as well as a path for an emancipatory, 
political-ethical RJ. This would enrich the extant theoretical literature on RJ in a number of 
interconnected ways. Firstly, and more generally, the ‘apparatus’ as analytical prism has never been 
used to reconstruct and discuss RJ. This paper suggests that by using this approach it is possible to 
capture the multiple lines which constitute RJ, proposing a dynamic understanding of this subject still 
missing in much of the existing literature. Secondly, the paper endeavours to complicate the 
representation of RJ as a neoliberal form of justice (Pavlich 2005; Richards 2005, 2011; Woolford and 
Ratner 2007) by laying out an account whereby neoliberal and neoconservative elements are subsumed 
under a different political rationality (ethopolitics). Thirdly, by sketching out a preliminary normative 
path for the development of RJ, this work aims to complement the available Foucauldian literature on 
this topic, often more oriented toward the critique of RJ than the identification of new options (O’Malley 
2009). Finally, the paper intends to give a (minor) contribute to Foucauldian studies, and namely to 
those positions which connect different domains within Foucault’s work on normative/epistemic 
grounds (Valverde 2008). The combination between ‘apparatus’ and ‘ethics’, in fact, warrants both a 
re-configuration of RJ and the production of a type of knowledge which aims ‘to cut’, not only to 




3. A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive elements 
 
3.1 Discursive elements 
  
The RJ apparatus is a fluid discursive field whereby scientific, philosophical and moral discourses 
juxtapose, intersect and conflict. Discourses are interpretations of the world ‘built into linguistically 
performed practices’ (Jäger and Maier 2016, p. 113) produced by social actors over time. Social actors 
mobilise discourses in order to make sense of themselves, their bodies, actions and relations (Foucault 
1972, p. 46). However, this process does not necessarily entail critical appreciation of which discourse 
to “download” from the “cloud” of accessible interpretations of the world. People are exposed to 
discourses apparently natural and pervasive, which influence their cognitive and emotional architectures 
perfunctorily. Yet, resistance to such an influence is possible by seizing upon the very inconsistencies 
 within and across discourses, provided that actors have the (cultural, economic, etc.) resources to decode 
them. Within this framework, discourses are always political constructs, since the definition of the 
criteria for legitimating knowledge within the discursive order is linked with context-specific power 
relations. This means that the composition as well as the availability, stability, salience and authority of 
those interpretations depend on their relationships with larger economic and socio-cultural struggles, 
which in turn they contribute to shape. Finally, it is worth noticing that discourses are not cohesive 
entities but changing sets of overlapping and/or conflicting knowledges available at certain time in 
certain places, whose apparent cohesiveness is merely the result of the researcher’s unifying gaze. 
 
3.1.1. Justice stakeholding 
‘Victims’, ‘offenders’ and ‘communities’ in RJ are consistently represented as justice stakeholders, that 
is, as active participants in the process of addressing the criminal behaviour, due to their “direct” stake 
in the crime and its aftermath (Johnstone 2011, p. 119). The rise of RJ is a response to the 
marginalisation of the direct stakeholders in favour of the state’s empowerment, realised through 
conventional criminal justice (Zehr 2005). The state here is included by (partial) exclusion: it defines 
what a crime is and then, to some extent, it devolves the decisions on the consequences of crime to the 
direct stakeholders. RJ, in fact, assigns a critical decision-making role to those who take up the positions 
of ‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’, supposedly operating in this way a ‘shift in the power related 
to who controls and owns crime in society – a shift from the state to the individual citizen and local 
communities’ (Umbreit 1994, p. 162). This discourse rests on the premise that crimes are underpinned 
by interpersonal bonds which “belong” to relevant victims, offenders and communities. Therefore, the 
redress of the consequences of crime requires the direct involvement of those actors. The concept of 
offender-as-stakeholder is cast against the taken-for-granted representation of the offender’s passive 
role on the stage of conventional criminal justice (Christie 1977; Zehr 2005). ‘Stakeholding’ here is 
predicated on an idea of direct responsibility (cf. Garland 2001; Pavlich 2005) which can be particularly 
appreciated by looking at the role of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite 1989) within RJ. Shaming 
techniques are normally used to elicit active responsibility, by providing the offender with opportunities 
to disapprove the criminal act whilst exposing herself/himself to the emotional views of the other 
stakeholders, as a condition for the symbolic/material reparation to take place. As for the victim-as-
stakeholder, this idea seems informed by academic victimology as well as by demands put forth by 
victims’ movements. The victimological critique of the marginalisation of the victim in criminal justice 
(Marshall 1996, p. 23) and the advocated shift in focus from an old (based on victims’ rights) to a new 
(based on victims’ needs) way of appreciating and supporting crime victims (Maguire 1985; Mawby 
1988; Newburn 1993), have become key categories in the language of RJ. Especially, the representation 
of the victim’s needs to ‘be heard’ and ‘speak out’ seems driven by the victimological claim of victim 
empowerment (Garland 2001, p. 11). The concept of ‘community-as-stakeholder’ hinges on a number 
of philosophical and sociological speculations coalescing around different (and to some extent 
incompatible) declinations of the communitarian philosophy. Some cultural components stress the 
radical and humanitarian character of communitarian approaches to criminal justice (Bianchi 1994; 
Christie 1977; Hulsman 1986) whilst others the moralising role of communities in responding to crime 
(Etzioni 1993). Within the radical view, emphasis is placed on problematic situations/conflicts to be 
handled by involving those affected by them, reducing the role of the state in dealing with harm and 
wrongdoing. Hence, community-based measures can positively address the human repercussions of 
conflicts, letting stakeholders regain control over their lives. This approach diverges significantly from 
the conservative-moralising interpretation of ‘community’ in RJ. Here, the mobilisation of ‘community’ 
is deemed as a cure against the sterilisation of the social capital (Etzioni 1993; Giddens 1998) prompted 
by the combined action of conservative individualism and post-war social democracy (Driver and 
Martell 1997, p. 27). This understanding opens the way for the investment (symbolic and material) in 
the community as a site of the fight against both crimes and actions which embody a lack of 
respect/responsibility. From this perspective, RJ is expression of the moralisation of crime control, built 
around a common belonging to communitarian meta-values: priority to “insiders” over “outsiders”, to 
collectivity over individuals as well as moral cohesiveness and cultural homogeneity. 
 
3.1.2. Embodied encounters 
 This discourse comprises some of the normative propositions which drive direct stakeholders in dealing 
with the consequences of criminal behaviours (Zehr 2005). The encounter is the regulated setting which 
supposedly enables the re-establishment of victims’ safety, both physical and emotional (Johnstone 
2011, p. 52; Van Ness and Strong 2015, p. 100). Within the encounter, victims fulfill the need to tell 
their story and to find answers to some fundamental questions (e.g. why the crime happened to them, 
why they responded as they did, etc.) (Johnstone 2011, p. 52; Zehr 2005, pp. 26–27). Furthermore, the 
encounter is where the com­munity’s involvement and participation is mobilised (Johnstone 2011, p. 
126), that is, where the stakeholders’ support networks actively engage with each other. As for the 
offender, the encounter offers a possibility to connect with the victim, to take responsibility after 
“seeing” the impact of her/his behaviours, and to “take care” of the victim’s well-being impacted by the 
crime (Dignan 2002). 
At the same time, the encounter is the space where the identities constituted by the RJ process may be 
contested, that is, whereby ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ may attempt to negotiate or reject those labels as 
well as the duties and rights associated to them. The same could be said in relation to the social, 
economic and political characteristics of crime: while the structure of restorative encounters seems to 
ignore them, and to instead take the concept and the conditions of crime for granted, by “giving voice” 
to the direct stakeholders and their support networks, this very structure also allows for the possibility 
that these issues might come to the fore. 
A further critical point is that dialogue and restoration cannot take place within the encounter without 
the support of an independent/third party who distinguishes appropriate issues from unacceptable ones, 
channelling communication toward restorative objectives. The facilitator/mediator, in fact, ensures the 
effective communication between stakeholders, by paraphrasing, acknowledging, 
translating/verbalising emotions, and synthesising ideas (Brigg 2003, p. 295), in this way, controlling 
the conflict’s “warm side” (Richards 2011). This third party works as an ‘architect of choice’ (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2008), who reframes decisions and actions without directly coercing, but by inducing, 
guiding and nudging (Rose 2017, p. 307). The idea of encounter as free-but-regulated environment, is 
underpinned by a range of moral propositions which highlight stakeholders’ personal responsibility. 
The focus on the victim’s choice to engage with the restorative process as well as the accent on the 
offender’s personal accountability and active responsibility are characteristics of the moral 
infrastructure of RJ, mobilised within the encounter (Zehr 2005). This is the time/space whereby 
autonomy is supposedly nurtured, conveying the message that norms of obligation, accountability and 
responsibility continually turn the subject back on itself. Victims and offenders are deemed to have the 
necessary moral and practical resources to engage in restoration, which is the outcome of their 
autonomous decisions. Yet, the facilitator’s work is a condition for the encounter to be restorative, 
assuming that parties will not be able to find restoration by themselves, somehow conflicting with the 
justice stakeholding idea outlined above.  
 
3.1.3 Enabling reparation 
The ‘enabling reparation’ discourse consists of a range of themes and problems elaborated by 
advocates, practitioners, policy makers, at the very core of RJ. It refers to one of the essential aims of 
the restorative encounter, that is, the repairing of harms caused by the crime (Wright 1982, 1996). This 
discourse rejects the retributive idea to coerce the offender to endure pain proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence, promoting instead reparation of the crime’s harmful consequences. From this 
perspective, offenders are accountable in a proactive way, they are required to actively take 
responsibility (Miers et al. 2001) by repairing the harm. Reparation addresses both material and 
symbolic harms (Johnstone 2011, p. 1; Marshall 1999, p. 7; Zehr 2005, p. 186). It includes the offender’s 
positive engagement with the community, since this is harmed by the crime (Johnstone 2011, p. 1; 
Liebmann 2007, p. 24; Zehr 2005, p. 186). In this way, the offender is “capacitated” to heal the social 
bonds which allegedly tie her/him with the community, whose cohesiveness is threatened by the 
criminal behaviour (Marshall 1999, p. 6). This discourse seems informed by at least two broad (and 
partly diverging) developments in criminological theory, that is, ‘civilising criminal justice’ theories 
(Wright, Blad and Cornwell 2013) and ‘third way criminologies’ (Hoyle and Noguera 2008; Hughes 
2007). The first group of theories stresses civil justice measures (mainly mediation and restitution) as 
swifter, cheaper and more effective ways of doing justice, focusing on the harmful repercussions of 
 crimes. ‘Civilisation’ either means the general substitution of civil law for criminal law (Barnett 1977; 
Cantor 1976) or at least the more limited introduction of civil measures in order to improve the quality 
of criminal justice for victims and communities (Wright, Blad and Cornwell 2013). RJ here equates 
with reparation, understood as a specific technique of privatising both the consequences of and the way 
of dealing with crimes. 
The second set of interpretations foregrounds the idea of crime as an effect of the progressive erosion 
of the moral fabric of local communities and families (Braithwaite 1989, 2002; Braithwaite and Pettit 
1990; Duff 1992, 2000; Dzur 2003). The responses proposed for criminal behaviours are 
responsibilising interventions for offenders: punishment is a way of modelling social identities to be 
consistent with community values. A central target of these moral-communitarian analyses and 
interventions, is youth crime and deviance, whose supposed growth from the 1980s is regarded as a 
symptom of dying communities. Particularly, the focus is placed on “everyday” youth offenders, that 
is, de-responsibilised individuals lacking self-control and a clear moral compass (Muncie 1999). This 
image is recurrent within the reparation discourse, since the typical actors of reparation are described 
as immature youths who breach the interpersonal trust which ties them and the victim together, within 
a shared community (Muncie 1999; Newburn and Crawford 2003). From this perspective, RJ can be 
conceptualised as a third way response to the youth problem, beyond retribution and rehabilitation, 
centring on responsibilisation and requiring reparation.  
 
3.1.4. Inter/intra-personal transformation 
Finally, RJ is often represented by scholars, advocates and practitioners as a paradigm of personal 
transformation. Within this discourse, RJ is understood as an ‘emotionally intelligent justice’ (Sherman 
2003) which can lead people to perceive and act upon the world and themselves in a restorative way, 
i.e. relying on peacebuilding through dialogue (Sullivan and Tifft 2001). The premise of this view is a 
relational understanding of humans (Johnstone and Van Ness 2007, p. 17), their natural 
interconnectedness which can be hindered by destructive behaviours. Transformation means victims’ 
healing, offenders’ reintegration and community-building. It entails the stakeholders’ inclusion into a 
community-based positive moral order (Van Ness and Strong 2015, p. 39) to be achieved (or stimulated) 
through the restorative encounter, symbolically and psychologically. This discourse intertwines, as far 
as principles and goals are concerned, with a range of philosophical speculations and ethical doctrines 
(both secular and religious) concerned with the spiritual dimensions of crime and justice. Secular 
sources are the ‘therapeutic’, ‘recovery’, ‘self-help’ and ‘New Age’ movements who have supported 
the expansion of RJ as a form of healing and empowering justice (Richards 2005), particularly in the 
US. Namely, the focus on closure, healing, reconciliation and shared-humanity (Consedine 1995) as 
distinctive aims pursued by RJ, seems highly consonant with the claims put forth by self-help 
movements. Additionally, it resonates with a range of religious belief systems, particularly Mennonites 
and Quakers doctrines (Liebmann 2007). Their focus on non-violent responses to wrongdoing, spiritual 
reform and community-based justice mechanisms are consonant with RJ’s tenets (Immarigeon 1994), 
as well as one of the conditions for the Mennonite and Quakers’ long-lasting advocacy for the 
development of RJ (Marshall 1999).  
 
The different representations of the crime stakeholders as well as of the ideas of ‘encounter’, 
‘reparation’ and ‘transformation’, are all objects produced discursively. There are intersections and 
clashes between and within them which configure the apparatus as a “battlefield”, whereby such 
disparate and, to some extent, incompatible objects compete for epistemic priority. Within the ‘justice 
stakeholding’ discourse, radical and moral communitarian approaches portray the ‘community’ in 
incongruous ways: a virtual site for democratic dialogue and a real entity characterised by moral 
cohesiveness. This latter interpretation resonates with third way approaches to crime control informing 
the reparation discourse whilst the former conflicts with victimological takes on victims’ personal 
empowerment. The spiritual roots of ‘transformation’ are not completely coherent with the idea of a 
swifter and cheaper justice advocated by the ‘civilising’ perspectives on reparation. Moreover, the 
emphasis on disempowered victims collides with the focus on de-responsibilised youths, when it comes 
to define the main beneficiaries of RJ. Whilst these tensions are constitutive of the apparatus, they can 
be seized upon by social actors and used to hinder the unfolding of the apparatus itself (see sections 6.2 
and 6.3). Furthermore, the consistency between only some of those objects and the current political 
 conjuncture deeply affects the legitimation and institutionalisation of some them and the silencing of 
others. 
 
3.2 Non-discursive elements  
 
RJ discourses are instantiated into legal and administrative documents, practices, venues and 
organisational forms by institutions. Institutions are social actors whose behaviours are typified over 
time, that is, enacted reiteratively up to the point to be perceived as material and stable components of 
everyday life (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966). They act as ‘system[s] of constraint’ (Foucault 
1980[1977], p. 198) which structure the social field, according to their specific intentionality. The 
process of institutionalising RJ is not a mere translation of discourses into “practice”. It actually brings 
about new forms of knowledge, power and resistance which retroact on the discursive elements. Three 
main types of institutions should be explored here: conventional criminal justice institutions, 
communitarian institutions and RJ regulatory bodies. 
 
3.2.1. Conventional criminal justice institutions 
Police, courts, prisons and probation agencies have been involved in the deployment of RJ since the 
1970s. Police have been one of the first agencies to practice RJ in the UK, by training officers to 
restorative interventions as well as by launching and running RJ services (Davis 1992). One of the 
reasons of such an appeal has been that RJ, as a policing option, is perceived as a cost-effective measure 
which fits with the community policing philosophy (ACPO 2011; Home Office 1997, 2009; Restorative 
Justice Council 2014). This police-led understanding adds at least one further layer to the discourses on 
RJ, that is, the idea of RJ as a street-level efficient conflict management option. RJ, in the police hands, 
is a de-formalised strategy for dealing with minor (often youth) crimes, characterised by lack of 
procedural safeguards and speedy proceedings. In a similar way, within court proceedings, RJ is 
conceptualised as a type of ‘penal sanction’ (Wood and Suzuki 2016, p. 149), insofar as responsibilising 
the offender replaces or complements retribution (Liebmann 2007; Marshall 1999). Here, reparation of 
the harm and reduction of re-offending are critical goals, whilst the ideas of encounter and 
transformation are downplayed.  
As for penal institutions, whilst probation services have administered RJ programs since the 1970s, 
prisons are a more recent institutional arrangement whereby RJ has found some applications. In this 
context, RJ is a penal option additional to conventional punishment, that this, a condition for probation 
or an element of the sentence (Davis 1992). Probation services have especially advocated for 
transformative-reparative initiatives focussing on the offender’s needs. Their attention on diversion, 
mitigation and offender education, have characterised since the 1970s reparative schemes for youth 
criminals (Liebmann 2007, p. 40) becoming a constant component of diversionary interventions (Davis 
1992). 
Courts and prisons seem to embrace a punitive version of RJ. Here, the role of the victim is downplayed, 
considering that often prison-based RJ programs consist of rehabilitation and other offender-oriented 
activities (Wood and Suzuki 2016, p. 151). This understanding enriches the discourses on RJ by 
pointing up issues such as public accountability, afflictive responses and community protection. At the 
same time, it provokes tensions, since, especially for police and courts, RJ resonates with managerial 
concerns (reduction of workload, speeding up justice process, etc.) (ACPO 2011) which are at odds 
with the transformative aims purported by scholars and advocates. 
 
3.2.2. Communitarian and regulatory institutions 
RJ discourses are deployed by a relatively wide range of communitarian institutions such as third sector 
agencies, non-governmental organisations, and voluntary groups working within and alongside criminal 
justice settings. Here, an important role is played in by victim support organisations. These groups have 
contributed to criminal justice reform and to the institutionalisation of RJ, with a number of actions 
ranging from the advocacy for a victim-sensitive justice (Fry 1951) to setting some early RJ services 
(Liebmann 2007; Rock 1990). Differently from conventional criminal justice institutions, these 
organisations have paid particular attention to the relational side of crime, supporting the transformative 
potential of RJ, in terms of fulfilling victims’ needs. Historically, their support to the idea of ‘repairing 
the harm’ of crime has been wavering. Early reparative projects in the UK and US during the late 1970s 
 were seen with ambivalence by victims’ organisations, due to their apparent link with probation-led 
offender-centred initiatives (Davis 1992). However, over the years, victims’ associations have 
embraced RJ interventions, by designing them as victim-centred schemes which require the offender’s 
admission of responsibility, denying any fact-finding role to restorative encounters. This viewpoint, 
partially overlapping with the ‘stakeholding’ and ‘transformation’ discourses, has been finally codified 
by the European Directive on Victims’ Rights 29/12 (see art. 12 on RJ as victims’ service). For victims’ 
organisations, RJ is a peculiar penal mechanism which resembles the police and courts’ appreciation of 
RJ, with one main difference: the goal here is to empower the victim more than responsibilising the 
offender or delivering swift justice.  
A further category to be examined is the range of institutional bodies created to lead the practical 
implementation of RJ. These are the ‘RJ councils’ which oversee the definition and application of RJ 
training standards as well as the delivery of RJ services, exerting a form of control (for instance by RJ 
‘quality marks’) upon this bottom-up model of justice. Examples can be found in the UK, US and 
Europe. They are mainly state-based institutions which deliver training and advocacy services, draft 
policy documents which, along with laws passed by parliaments, constitute RJ’s macro-regulatory core. 
These subjects represent a “state-funded community”, resonating with third way approaches to crime 
control. 
 
The process of institutionalisation remodels RJ discourses. The issues of efficiency or punitiveness 
foregrounded by criminal justice institutions clash against (some of) the representations of what RJ shall 
achieve, put forth by victims’ organisations and probation services. Victims’ organisations champion a 
victim-centred discourse, which conflicts with the probation-led rehabilitative understanding of RJ 
focussed on youth offenders’ needs. These frictions further complicate the RJ apparatus, by adding a 
layer of material knowledge which generates its own goals, draws on different or alternative 
justifications and retroacts on the discursive components. In light of this, reparation as a civilised justice 
measure finds an unexpected ally in the police’s search for a swifter justice, within a context of increased 
managerialisation. The encounter, as horizontal space for dialogue, is re-modelled by the emphasis 
placed by victims’ organisations on victim-centred RJ and collides with offender-sensitive positions. 
The democratic community represented by voluntary lay people, imagined by Nils Christie (1977), is 
silenced by third way criminologies, embodied by state-funded communitarian organisations. 
 
 
4. The connection between heterogeneous elements 
 
The discursive and non-discursive components outlined above, are connected in a distinctive way. The 
nature of this link is at the same time epistemological and normative. This connection enables the 
apparatus to create a programmable reality, by legitimating and reproducing certain epistemic objects 
and then by imposing ethical and political regularities on them. This internal drive, as it will be argued 
in the next section, responds to a contingent political need. 
 
4.1 Epistemological work 
The RJ apparatus performs a characteristic epistemological work. This activity consists in the creation 
of a knowledge which weaves together discursive and non-discursive elements, strategically. This 
‘restorative knowledge’ is needs-based, functionalist, dichotomic and embodied.  
In RJ, stakeholders’ actions are conceived of as ‘needs-based’ (instead of based on e.g. interests or 
rights), that is, driven by basic wants rooted in human nature, valid beyond space and time, gender, 
ethnicity and socioeconomic status. RJ, in fact, ‘relies on clear guiding principles that are not related to 
any one particular ideology or religion but instead represent universal principles about human 
interactions’ (Bender and Armour 2007, p. 253). From this viewpoint, legal violations are 
conceptualised as the expressions of non-functioning interpersonal relationships. These engender 
harmful consequences on people and “belong” to those harmed (victims, communities) and harming 
(offenders). Such relationships trigger natural needs of participation, mainly articulated by the demand 
of having a say in managing the crime consequences. However, such a process can only run after the 
offender’s admission of responsibility, since RJ is not about fact-finding but about controlling the 
relational impacts of crimes. Clearly, this excludes any critique of criminalisation, requiring just a re-
 framing of the meaning of crime: from an offence against the “crown” to an interpersonal harm which 
ought to be addressed. It is irrelevant under which (political, cultural, moral, aesthetic) circumstances 
behaviours are labelled as crimes, whilst it is plain that they trigger needs of participation or 
stakeholding. It is simply accepted that certain actions are criminal, implicitly endorsing both law-
making and law-enforcement. 
RJ shows a functionalist appreciation of crime (Walgrave 2017, p. 97). Crime is seen as a pathology, a 
bad and wrong behaviour, which ought to be neutralised. RJ aspires to “cure” this pathology, healing 
the victim and transforming the offender, whilst neglecting both the emancipatory potential of 
transgressions of established legal frameworks and the power relationships which contribute toward the 
definition of behaviours as crimes. 
RJ envisions the relationships between victims and offenders as dichotomic, that is, as oppositions 
between parties individually responsible of their actions. This entails the correlative definition of power 
relations, between the same actors, as essentially oppressive, unbalanced and binary, but also depending 
on their will/choice, and therefore amenable to resolution/transformation. Restorative settings aim at 
countervailing supposed power imbalances between parties, “restoring” harmony, bringing 
transformation and reparation. However, power relations are re-established by the very dualistic way 
RJ frames victims and offenders, before, during and after the encounter. 
Crime stakeholders are fashioned as clearly identifiable individuals. The idea of “disembodied” crime 
stakeholders (e.g. corporations or states) is hardly compatible with the RJ apparatus; RJ addresses (and 
reproduces) human, flesh-and-blood individuals (Maglione 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Yet, these embodied 
subjects do not appear to have any specific gender, ethnicity or socioeconomic status, which 
paradoxically resonates with enlightenment-based images of criminal justice actors. Their body is an 
emotional entity, strongly idealised. Additionally, they are consistently represented as fixed and 
exclusive. Victims, offenders and communities are constructed as ontologically different, overlaps or 
resemblances are excluded. Offenders are modelled as “everyday” rule-breakers whilst victims are 
structured as vulnerable and disempowered subjects, although still resilient and in search of reparation. 
Communities are depicted as local even parochial entities, opposed to both statual and societal 
institutions. This knowledge around crime stakeholders underlines their being morally deprived but 
morally responsible: they are emotionally involved and psychologically affected; for this reason they 
are in need of being directed from outside (by the facilitator). However, if the encounter does not 
achieve restoration, it will be their own responsibility.  
 
4.2. Normative work 
This plan of reality, populated by embodied stakeholders tied by dichotomic bonds, is subjected to 
ethical/political regulation. This regulation in turn, supports the production of those objects, in a 
circular, although not frictionless, way. Such dynamic consists of imposing values, channelling flows 
of desire and activating exclusionary mechanisms. Since between and within epistemic objects there 
are tensions, contradictions and inconsistencies, their submission to the ethical/political regulation is 
productive of unforeseeable consequences, discontinuous and problematic as well.  
The apparatus imposes upon crime stakeholders a certain type of freedom rooted in a morally cohesive 
community. Victims and offenders’ freedom, in fact, can be exerted only against the backdrop of a 
community-as-moral-stabiliser. Here ‘community’ is not a place but a shared normative background, a 
form of objective ‘common sense’ (Rose, 2017, p. 314) which makes possible the encounter between 
“everyday” victims and offenders. The combination between freedom to choose and morally cohesive 
communities engenders a tension, considering that ‘the choice’ is not just a matter of individual 
dispositions and preferences, but a decision filtered by the community’s moral fabric. In RJ, the 
encounter, reparation of harm and personal transformation are all moral choices which seek to mend 
natural relations of trust and interdependency wounded by crime. These choices are mediated by a 
‘moral order [which] cannot rest on legal codes enforced and upheld by guardians; it is embodied and 
taught through the rituals and traditions in the everyday life of communities’ (Rose 2001, p. 9). 
‘Freedom’ here is converted into ‘liberty’, that is, a regulated, morally dense self-realisation toward 
which individual subjectivities are pressured to comply with (Rose 2017, p. 313).  
This ethical/political regulation is both productive and repressive. The apparatus channels people’s 
interests and desires of justice into restorative encounters in order to sublimate the crime’s emotional 
side, into “constructive” demands toward the offender. At the same time, it obliterates deeper and 
 broader economic, social and political power relations which underpin the very definition of what a 
crime is. The idea of empowering individual autonomy and self-control lies at the heart of this ethical 
regulation with political import, insofar as it fashions a self-controlling member of the body politic. The 
implicit definition of victims and offenders as emotionally loaded and lacking self-control parties calls 
for a certain type of normalisation. The restorative encounter, in fact, aims to induce liberating effects 
of self-inspection and self-regulation, whilst it underscores the duties of emotionally charged (and 
therefore in need of direction) subjects. Additionally, the apparatus activates exclusionary mechanisms, 
mainly by preventing the participation of possible stakeholders who do not fit the ideal actors 
constructed by RJ discourses. This can happen before or during the encounter. Collective victims of 
economic crimes, powerful victims, victims with shared responsibility, vulnerable offenders, 
offenders/victims, deviant communities will hardly “benefit” from RJ interventions, since they do not 
match the normative models of stakeholders drawn by the apparatus (Maglione 2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
Furthermore, parties who during the encounter refuse to comply with the identities required by the 




5. Responding to an urgent need 
 
The RJ apparatus pursues an overarching objective from which it is possible to infer the ‘urgent need’ 
driving this machine. It aims to develop self-controlling subjects, characterised by a regulated autonomy 
and responsibility, rooted in the normative ideal of morally cohesive communities. This is achieved by 
re-aligning individual ethos with political aims, and namely, by spreading moral discourses of 
responsible behaviour and constructing subjects as ethical citizens who take responsibility for their own 
well-being (McKee 2008). Ethopolitics is a style of government (Rose 1996a; Rose and Miller 1992) 
which interpellates people’s ethos, i.e. how individuals problematise their everyday lifestyles choices 
(Chandler and Reid 2016, p. 47). Here, the focus of political regulation is placed on people’s inner life, 
divesting attention from the external world of social practices and institutions. Ethopolitics concentrates 
on segments of population politically qualified and culturally homogeneous, which in turn it contributes 
to shape. In ethopolitics, traditionally neoliberal themes such as individual responsibility, securitisation 
and managerialism intersect with neo-conservative issues such as the moralisation of crime control and 
idealisation of pro-social communities and families (O’Malley 2009). This combination is less stable 
as it could appear, since there are tensions between individual freedom, self-interest and collective 
morality. 
Ethopolitical technologies regulate in specific ways individuals and groups who appear as insiders 
(Maglione 2018a, 2018b). Their transgressions can be represented as dysfunctional relationships 
between discrete subjects to be dealt with by needs-based restoration instead of expressive punishments, 
situational controls or radical social reform. The RJ apparatus contributes toward the ethopolitical 
government in a number of interlinked ways (Rose 1996a; Rose and Miller 1992).  
RJ de-socialises security and securitises personal safety (Schuilenburg 2012, p. 75). This means that RJ 
constructs security as a negative/private state of immunisation from risk and dangers (Burke 2002). 
Individuals are required to take action (i.e. to responsibilise themselves) in ensuring their own security-
as-safety (Flint 2003), by neutralising dangers and risks for their individual well-being. This state of 
security can never be achieved; life cannot be completely secured, without killing life itself, and dangers 
cannot be exorcised without re-evoking them. Therefore, securitisation is a program in endless tension, 
targeting fluid lifestyles more than material conditions of security (Chandler and Reid 2016). However, 
this form of responsibilisation (Burchell 1996; Garland 2001; Pavlich 2005) seems directed only to 
certain types of offenders, victims and communities. Offenders who breach the interpersonal trust which 
ties them and the victim together, victims ontologically distinguished from the offender and pro-social 
communities can access responsibilisation strategies. Offenders of “special concern”, victim/offenders 
and “disorderly” communities, instead, will be likely targeted by state-centred (muscular) control 
strategies.  
Further, RJ interventions operate a hybrid (i.e. beyond the public/private divide) style of crime control 
(Rose 2001). Particularly, the production of a virtual space – the community – as a stage of RJ 
interventions, is an expression of this mode of control. RJ, in fact, is about imaging participatory 
 decision-making processes to deal with crimes, by devolving to victims and offenders the power to 
address the harm experienced, within and through their communities. Again, such a site is not available 
to any offender or victim. It requires “community membership”, i.e. the alignment with an idealised 
citizen marked by homogeneity, regulated deviance, and belonging. This position appears underpinned 
by the knowledge created and promoted by the third way criminologies with their drive toward the 
identification of new settings for doing control for those offenders (and perhaps victims) who are not 
of “special concern”.  
Finally, RJ neutralises the political, social, and economic character of crimes (Rose 1998, p. 165). RJ 
interventions deactivate the political/social content of a variety of problematics (Browsher 2017), 
installing a concept of crime stakeholder as an autonomous, self-directing, decision-making agent (Rose 
1999, p. 468). It neutralises ‘the political claims held by these subjects and replace[s] them with the 
therapeutic need for reconciliation and healing’ (Renner 2015, p. 1110).  
 
To claim that RJ responds to ethopolitical needs entails both that RJ supports the unfolding of 
ethopolitics and that ethopolitics facilitates the institutionalisation of certain versions of RJ. The 
moralising understanding of community, the idealised versions of crime stakeholders, the third way 
control exerted by the facilitator over participants, the aims of RJ institutional bodies and the partnership 
between these and conventional criminal justice institutions, have become authoritative within the 
apparatus due to their consistency with ethopolitical imperatives. Conversely, other components of the 
RJ apparatus (e.g. radical democratic communities, encounters as dispute resolution arenas, critique of 
criminalisation, etc.) are de-legitimised, since they are conflicting with ethopolitical needs. By the same 
token, RJ for disenfranchised and deprived groups is epistemically silenced and marginalised. However, 
these de-legitimised versions of RJ might still thrive whereby ethopolitics is less developed or countered 
by other political rationalities. 
 
 
6. Subjective entrapment and critical resistance 
 
6.1 Subjection 
As Deleuze and Agamben suggest, subjective entrapment is integral to the apparatus. This idea, 
although absent in the Foucauldian definition of the apparatus, resonates with the concept of 
‘subjection’ elaborated by Foucault in the early 1980s (Foucault 1982). This concept refers to ‘the 
submission of subjectivity’ to external authorities (Foucault 1982, p. 212), that is, to the process by 
which people internalise and reproduce norms of conduct and identities devised by other social actors. 
Subjection becomes domination when those norms and identities are naturalised by external actors in 
pursuit of their own goals. This results in silencing different or alternative ways of being, becoming and 
doing, and therefore in limiting people’s freedom. The RJ apparatus is a subjugating machine, since 
both its epistemological and normative activities are oriented toward producing subjectivities consistent 
with ethopolitical imperatives (Rose 1990, p. 213). Operationally, this happens by organising a milieu 
(i.e. the restorative encounters) within which certain knowledges and behaviours are encouraged whilst 
other are disqualified. Within these spaces, ethopolitical dynamics let subjects play their freedom whilst 
structuring their conduct (Lazzarato 2015; Rose 1996b). Individual freedom becomes the very 
instrument through which individuals are directed (Lorenzini 2018). This process shapes subjects 
constitutively engaged in managing the outcomes of their life and continuously aspiring to empower 
themselves (Read 2009; Roberts 2006). The ‘injunction to be active’ (Lazzarato 2015, p. 187) fuels a 
host of passions which are consonant with the neoliberal mentality: shame, resentment, guilt and fear. 
However, these are (incongruously) countervailed by the micro-moral scaffold provided by the 
communities which are supposed to ground the restorative subject, emphasising localism, organicism, 
cohesion, loyalty. Shaming techniques here play an exemplary role, since they encapsulate both sides 
of this incongruent subjection process. They ‘individualise structural deprivation’ whilst ‘reimagining 
of the “rational individual” or of “homo economicus” as an emotional being’ (Soldatic and Morgan 
2017, p. 114) rooted in idealised communities (Davies and Chisholm 2018). 
The restorative subject is not only a micro-moral entrepreneur but also an emotional consumer of justice 
(Bauman 2007). RJ is about gratifying victims’ desires of emotional justice and satisfying offenders’ 
wants of putting things right. It is not surprising, from this perspective, that the success of RJ services 
 is often measured in terms of stakeholders’ ‘satisfaction’ (Shapland et al. 2007; cf. O’Mahony and Doak 
2017). There is neither room for interrogating the providers of justice-services and reparation-products, 
nor chance to reflect on the social impact of consuming them. The only (binary) option available is 
accepting/not accepting the restorative scheme, and even when the choice is to accept, consumers will 
still go through the selective assessment carried out by the facilitator. The enfranchisement dispensed 
by the restorative framework is partial, and here lies the core of the restorative subjection. As already 
mentioned, (entrepreneurial/consumeristic) choices can be exercised only within a proceduralised 
framework informed by moral-communitarian values which represent the normative core of RJ. 
Additionally, only those with community membership can benefit from this inclusive style of penal 
control (O’Malley 2009).  
 
6.2 Subjectivation 
To think of RJ in these terms urges the critical researcher to envision challenges to such subjective 
entrapment. The overall goal, here, is to sketch out a strategy to counter ethopolitical subjection with 
political-ethical subjectivation, understood as a collective practice of problematising individual conduct 
toward the other (Foucault 1984a, 1997). Such a ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault 2007, p. 259) would 
connect social and individual, politics and ethics as a form of resistance against the way ethopolitics 
structures people’s conduct, generating creative prospects for re-inventing subjectivities. 
Ethics is defined by Foucault as the ‘reflexive practice of freedom’ (1997, p. 281), that is, the intentional 
range of activities aiming to transform an individual into a moral subject (Foucault 1986). The process 
of subjectivation consists of a transformative and relational practice whose condition and outcome is 
freedom. In Foucault’s view, the activity of ethical fashioning is constituted by four formal elements, 
whose contents are subject to historical variation: the ontological element or ‘ethical substance’, the 
deontological element or ‘mode of subjection’, the ascetic element or ‘ethical work’, and the 
teleological element or ‘telos’ (Foucault 1984a, pp. 353–355). It is the ‘ethical work’ or ‘care of the 
self’ which can create opportunities for critical disentanglement from the apparatus’ subjection. The 
‘ethical work’ is a continuing activity rather than an adherence to pre-established moral codes, which 
brings the ethical self into being and can be practiced only when there is sufficient freedom which, 
conversely, is the result of engaging in the practices of ‘care of the self’. Freedom is not some end state 
achieved by eluding all manners of restriction; rather, to be free is to be involved in effecting change in 
the world, and to be an ethical being is to be a social actor (Infinito 2003, p. 157). From this angle, RJ 
spaces should afford possibilities to reflect upon the process of criminalisation instead of passively 
endorsing the subjugating labels imposed by conventional criminal justice (e.g. ‘victim’ and ‘offender’) 
as well as to critically re-think the labels propounded by authoritative discourses of RJ (‘healing’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘closure’, etc.). RJ should provide arenas to problematise commonalities and 
differences, challenges and constraints, both at individual and social levels, that parties experience in 
their pursuit of justice when their needs are obliterated or threatened. RJ should allow possibilities for 
re-imagining forms of cohabitation, in non-violent and dialogical ways, whereby differentials of power 
are openly considered. This is as much an ethical as a political and social practice ‘inclusive of a relation 
to others’, the generation of new ‘way[s] of being together, of being-with-others’ (Revel 2009, pp. 48–
49), that is, a collective subjectivation. This understanding of ethics, in fact, ‘both forbids a return to 
individualism (such as the idea of the individual as the free entrepreneur of him/herself) and resists 
every temptation towards the naturalization, substantialization or essentialization of the self’ (Revel 
2009, pp. 48–49). Thus, restorative arenas would turn into political sites with a strong anarchist bent, 
aiming to challenge ‘objectification, hierarchization or control’ (Revel 2009, pp. 48–49) of conduct 
engendered by the apparatus. As David Hoy contends, this strategy of ‘desubjugation’ does not consist 
in finding our “true” self behind ideological masks, but in re-inventing ourselves, by contesting the 
selves effected by the forces of conformism, and then by engaging in creative practices of subjectivation 
(Hoy 2004, p. 103). This is not only a crafting of individual selves, but of collective, communal, or 
social subjectivities, avoiding entrapment by externally imposed and naturalised identities. Apparatuses 
will continue to operate and engender as much subjection as spaces for resistance which could be shaped 
as political-ethical in an endless game ‘of resistance and power, subjectivation and objectification, 







RJ, through the lenses offered by the apparatus, appears as a relational, heterogeneous and constantly 
changing tangle of power/knowledge relations, productive of plans of reality which form subjectivities. 
This network responds to a specific historical and contingent need, the ethopolitical government of 
certain segments of population, in western affluent states. The RJ apparatus, in fact, is both a mechanical 
and a strategic system which contributes toward the functioning of the ethopolitical rationality. This is 
characterised by hyper-individualising and de-politicising dynamics staged against an idealised 
community. The RJ apparatus does not deliver “justice” for everyone. It addresses (and reproduces) 
specific actors tied by embodied, natural and dichotomic relations, that is, everyday offenders and 
innocent victims. The need for envisioning forms of disentanglement from this network emerges as an 
imperative for the critical researcher. This need can be addressed by drawing upon Foucault’s ethics, 
and namely his conceptualisation of the ethical self-fashioning as political practice, which generates 
insights into forms of individual/social critical resistance to the apparatus. From this perspective, the 
goal of restorative encounters would be to offer a chance for engaging in an activity of ‘questioning and 
adjusting of thought and action in relation to notions of human good and harm’ in order to carry out 
‘work on the self and consideration of how to be and act in relation to others’ (Christie 2005, p. 40). 
The self-ethical fashioning is ‘not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice. The care of the self 
[...] appears then as an intensification of social relations’ (Foucault 1986, p. 53). The path suggested for 
an emancipatory RJ is to invest in RJ practices as radically democratic arenas which politicise conflicts 
by linking personal challenges with political contradictions, discussing criminalisation and stressing the 
social and cultural character of harms. The outcome would not be individual healing or empowerment, 
but ethical reflection and critique of the conditions for individual transgressions of people’s freedom as 
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